



Shaping conduct and bridling passions: Governing practicum 
supervisors practice of assessment 
 
Abstract 
Courses preparing early childhood professionals through institutes of technical and 
further education utilise competency standards to guide the assessment of students during 
professional experience. Some universities offering early childhood teacher education 
courses use the term ‘competencies’ in practicum assessment forms and draw on teacher 
competency standards . This paper explores how discourses of competence produced 
within positivist and liberal humanist discourses shape, guide and direct (govern) tertiary 
supervisors' beliefs about and understandings of the legitimacy of their professional 
judgement. Tertiary supervisors take up these discourses and use them as the basis upon 
which they govern themselves. I argue that one of the effects of governmentality in this 
instance is that tertiary supervisors regulate and silence their professional judgement 
and defer to discourses of scientific rationality when assessing students on practicum 
placements. They produce assessment strategies that enable them to hide their subjective 
judgement within what appears to be a logical, rational and objective assessment process 
and position themselves as the rational, objective assessor, and at the same time, the fair, 






‘To govern, one could say, is to be condemned to seek an authority for one’s authority’ 




The practicum is an integral component of all courses that prepare early childhood 
professionals. It is the prime vehicle for the assessment of students’ practical skills; in 
fact, the practicum reigns supreme ‘as the decisive test of competency for teaching’ 
(Soliman, 1997, p.35). Courses preparing early childhood professionals through institutes 
of technical and further education (TAFE) in Australia utilise the Child Care National 
Competency Standards (1997) to guide the assessment of students during the practicum. 
The approach in institutes of higher education (universities) varies however the term 
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‘competencies’ is used in practicum assessment forms developed by some Australian 
university-based early childhood teacher education courses. Until recently some of these 
courses drew on the competency standards produced for teachers in Australia, The 
National Competency Framework for Beginning Teaching in developing practicum 
assessment documents. With the formation of institutes of teaching in the majority of 
states in Australia, some of which have developed teaching standards that specifically 
relate to early childhood teachers, we may see teaching standards used more widely in 
university based early childhood teacher education courses as the basis for assessing the 
practicum. 
 
The use of a competency-based approach to assess courses in human services and teacher 
education is a contentious issue. There are those who question the suitability of 
competency-based assessment (hereafter CBA) for assessing professional practice in 
human services and teacher education undergraduate courses (see for example, Ashworth 
& Saxton, 1990; Blunden, 1993; Delandshere & Arens, 2001; Kaye, 1994; Martin & 
Cloke, 2000; Westera, 2001), and some who vehemently oppose it (Fish, 1995). Others 
believe that its suitability depends on how competence is conceived (Butcher, 1995; 
Hager, Goncsi, & Athanasou, 1994), and how the competency statements used to assess 
students are framed (Barton & Elliot, 1996). This is particularly relevant to the practicum 
in TAFE-based early childhood courses in which competency standards are being used to 
assess the practicum. 
 
In the educational research literature there are a number of researchers who draw on 
Foucault’s (1991a, 1991b) work on disciplinary power and governmentality to critique 
the use of competency standards/frameworks at all levels of education (see for example, 
Bloomfield, 1997; Meadmore, 1997; Mulchay, 1996; Tan, 2004; Usher & Edwards, 
1994). The focus in this literature is primarily on how competency standards regulate and 
govern students through surveillance and normalisation. However students are not the 
only ones to feel the power effects of assessment. Mulcahy (1996) argues that teachers 
using competency standards are subject to the disciplinary power of the competencies. 
Her research indicated that although TAFE teachers modified competency standards and 
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used their own standards in their judgements of students’ achievements, they felt ‘under 
the threat of surveillance’ for engaging in such ‘unruly’ practice (p. 62). In this way, 
teachers are also disciplined (and governed) in and through CBA.  
 
In this article, I draw on findings from an Australian  study to explore how discourses of 
competence produced within positivist and liberal humanist discourses shape, guide and 
direct (govern) tertiary supervisors’ beliefs about and understandings of the legitimacy of 
their professional judgement. Discourses are systems of knowledge, often institutionally 
based, that act as the truth according to which individuals understand the world and their 
life in that world (MacNaughton, 2000). The article focuses on how the tertiary 
supervisors in the study took up discourses of competence produced within the meta 
discourses of positivism and liberal humanism and used them as the basis upon which 
they governed themselves. I argue that one of the effects of governmentality in this 
instance is that the tertiary supervisors regulated and silenced their professional 
judgement and deferred to discourses of scientific rationality when assessing students on 
practicum. They produced assessment strategies that enabled them to hide their subjective 
judgement within what appears to be a logical, rational and objective assessment process 
and positioned themselves as the rational, objective assessor, and at the same time, the 
fair, responsible tertiary supervisor (Ortlipp, 2005). 
 
In making sense of these findings I draw on the Foucauldian concepts of 
governmentality, technologies of the self and power-knowledge and use them as ‘tools’ 
(Foucualt, 1980a, p.65) to problematise the early childhood practicum assessment process 
as it is understood and practised by tertiary supervisors.  As Rose (1999) suggests, ‘Their 
value lies in the way in which they are able to provide a purchase for critical thought 
upon particular problems in the present’ (p. 9). In the context of this article, the problem 
is how tertiary supervisors understand and practise a competency-based, triadic approach 
to practicum assessment, particularly how they understand assessment and themselves as 




I begin by explaining the key concepts used to conceptualize my findings. I then provide 
an overview of the literature around CBA, particularly in relation to assessor bias and the 
use of professional judgement followed by an overview of the study from which the 
findings in this article are drawn. I then seek to show how the tertiary supervisors govern 
themselves and the effects in terms of their practices of assessment. Finally, I share 
insights arising from the poststructuralist theorizing and consider the implications for 
practice.  
 
The Conceptual Tools 
 
Foucault conceptualized the term government in general as ‘the conduct of conduct’ 
(Gordon, 1991, p.1). From this perspective government ‘refers to all endeavours to shape, 
guide, direct the conduct of others’ (Rose, 1999, p.3). It is also about how we govern 
ourselves (conduct our own conduct), which Foucault (1991) referred to as ‘the art of 
self-government’ (p.206). From this perspective government is the ‘ways in which one 
might be urged and educated to bridle one’s own passions, to control one’s own instincts’ 
(Rose, 1999, p.3).  These two aspects of government taken together constitute what 
Foucault called ‘governmentality’.  A study of governmentality investigates the 
‘strategies that seek to govern us and the ethics according to which we have come to 
govern ourselves’ (Rose, 1999, p. 9).  
 
Although CBA and triadic assessment are techniques and strategies which primarily seek 
to shape, guide and direct the conduct of those who are to be assessed, in this case, early 
childhood tertiary students, they ‘require certain forms of conduct on the part of those 
who would govern’ (Rose, 1999, p.52) and thus shape the conduct of those who enact the 
assessment process, in this case, the tertiary supervisors. The tertiary supervisors in my 
study were governed in and through discourses of competence and they used the norms 
for practice produced within these discourses to govern themselves; they exercised power 
upon themselves in order to constitute themselves as particular types of subjects.  
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The constitution of the self as a subject of discourse(s) via technologies of the self  
(Foucault, 2000b) involves knowledge of the self (gained through self-examination, 
reflection, confession) and knowledge of certain principles and rules of conduct which 
function as the ‘truth’, as prescriptions for how to conduct yourself (Foucault, 2000b). 
These truths and prescriptions are drawn from the norms and standards produced within 
discourses which have gained a certain status of truth  the disciplines or the human 
sciences  and they are used by the individual to shape, guide and judge their conduct as 
being a particular type of subject. In this way, individuals normalise themselves. They 
watch themselves and their behaviour, their thoughts and speech, and judge themselves 
against the norms which disciplinary knowledge (or discourse) produces. They style 
themselves according to norms and thus exercise power upon themselves.  
 
For Foucault (1982, 2000b), power is a relationship in which one individual (or group) 
seeks to direct the actions of another  to act upon their actions or future actions. From 
this perspective the connections between Foucault’s notion of government and his 
conceptualisation of power is readily apparent. As Rose (1999, p.4) proposes, within a 
Foucauldian framework, ‘To govern is to act upon action’.  The ability to act upon the 
actions of another depends on knowledge in that in order to exercise power, knowledge 
must be used (Foucault, 2000a). According to Foucualt, power cannot be seen in isolation 
from knowledge, and yet it is not the same as knowledge. They rely on each other, are 
integral to each other, they are together, and yet, at the same time, apart, which is why 
Foucault talked about power in its form ‘power-knowledge’ (Foucault, 2000a). 
 
Foucault was particularly interested in knowledge produced by the human sciences (the 
disciplines of medicine, psychiatry etc.); that is, knowledge about human beings. Certain 
types of knowledge gain the status of truth because they are constructed in ways that are 
considered appropriate for the time. Currently in western society, these appropriate 
methods are the scientific methods of rational investigation, such as observation, 
experimenting, testing and analysis, which produce classifications and categories of 
objects (including people/subjects). Competency-based assessment uses the scientific 
method of observation; it produces classifications and categories that subjectify students 
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and construct them as competent or not competent (Usher & Edwards, 1994). In addition, 
tertiary supervisors are constituted through such positivist discourses of assessment as 
objective observers and assessors undertaking a rational investigation (Ortlipp, 2003).  
 
 Context and Literature  
 
The focus of practicum assessment is on direct performance, but other aspects are also 
assessed; for example, underpinning knowledge, attitudes, values, and the ability to be 
reflective. These cannot be directly observed, and thus, must be inferred. In the practicum 
assessment process, the field supervisor and tertiary supervisor use observations of the 
student’s practical and written work  journals that include plans for learning 
experiences, evaluations of the program and reflections on practice  as data which 
provide evidence on which to base inferences. CBA of the practicum involves:  
 
the generation, collection and interpretation of evidence which is then compared with the 
performance criteria (or standards). This comparison forms the basis of a judgement which 
infers competent performance or otherwise. (Hager, Goncsi, & Athanasou, 1994, p. 12) 
 
There is recognition among researchers that CBA does involve assessor judgement and 
that it is not an objective measurement tool (Gillis & Bateman, 1999; Gillis and Griffin, 
1997; Hagar, Goncsi, & Athanasou, 1994; Wolf, 1995), however there seems to be an 
assumption that the criterion-referenced approach of CBA will guarantee a reasonably 
objective assessment. There is a perception that CBA is meant to be objective and that it 
does not require professional judgement (Jones, 1999). As Harris, Guthrie, Hobart and 
Lunberg (1995) put it, the CBA process ‘has a seductive objectivity and precision about 
it’ (p. 160). When people think about CBA, they do so within a discourse of assessment 
as rational and objective: a behaviourist discourse.  
 
Mulchay’s research (1996) into TAFE teachers’ practice of CBA found that teachers used 
their own industry and professional standards to achieve benchmarks for performance, 
because performance criteria could not provide a complete description of performance. 
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However they felt obliged to deny this work.   Similarly Hawe’s study (2002) of the use 
of standards-based assessment in teacher education in New Zealand found that academic 
staff used their own professional judgement rather than the published professional 
standards when making judgements on students’ practice. A study by Robinson (1993, 
cited in Jones, 1999) showed that TAFE teachers lacked confidence in their ability to 
judge a student’s competence, because they believed that the performance criteria 
provided an objective, transparent assessment checklist that absolved them of the need to 
exercise personal judgement. When these teachers found that the criteria were not 
prescriptive enough, and that they must use their own judgement, they felt a great deal of 
anxiety. More specifically, teachers in Robinson’s study were concerned about their 
capacity to confidently infer knowledge and understanding from physical performance.  
 
Even when assessors do believe that criteria cannot capture everything that makes up 
competency and that they need to exercise judgement, they tend to lack the confidence to 
take on this responsibility (Jones, 1999). In the context of assessment of the early 
childhood practicum, the problems with subjective judgement arise because many of the 
abilities that are valued in the early childhood profession are not technical skills that can 
be easily observed. They are more akin to what are sometimes called ‘soft skills’  
empathising, creativity, skills transfer, communication, problem solving, and the like 
(Costin, 2003). Costin argued that only one ‘instrument’ is suited to the assessment of 
these skills and that is: 
 
... a person or persons familiar with the context, experienced in the skills being assessed, 
skilled in observation and conversant with those ways of being and doing indicative of the 
soft skills being evaluated. Only such persons know where to look, how to look, and what 
to look for. (p. 153) 
 
He conceptualised the assessor as a ‘legitimate subjective observer’, and developed a 
holistic approach to the assessment of the ‘soft skills’ element of carpentry work, through 
an action research project undertaken in the context of Australian WorldSkills challenges. 
Some welcomed this change and others resisted it, not being prepared to let go of the 
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notion of objective assessment. One judge said that it required a ‘paradigm shift’ to work 
with the new assessment forms. As with the teachers in Robinson’s study, the assessors 
had interpreted CBA from within a positivist paradigm and believed that they should not 
use their experience or professional judgement in making assessment decisions. It was 
only when their subjective judgements were legitimised that they felt justified in 
implementing this assessment approach.  
 
Research shows that assessors do make judgements, but that this is not admitted by the 
assessor or the assessment documents (Mulcahy, 1996). It seems that many of the 
problems with CBA in the context of the early childhood practicum are entrenched in the 
nature of the dominant discourses within which those who implement assessment have 
constructed their understanding and practice.   
 
Overview of the Study 
 
A qualitative, case study approach was used to investigate how tertiary supervisors 
understand and practise practicum assessment. In keeping with a case study research 
method, multiple sources of evidence were used  documents, focus group interviews, 
individual interviews, email conversations, a questionnaire and reflective journals. This 
article uses data generated through focus group and individual interviews and practicum 
assessment forms and practicum policy and procedure documents from two of the three 
main institutions for which the participants conducted practicum assessment.  
 
The tertiary supervisors [1] who took part in the study supervised and assessed students 
enrolled in TAFE and/or university early childhood courses. The method of assessment 
that they used was CBA implemented through a triadic assessment process that involved 
the field supervisor [2], the student and the tertiary supervisor in a three-way discussion 
of the student’s progress against the assessment criteria for the practica.  All 17 
participants were qualified early childhood teachers at degree level or above. All but one 
of the participants was female.  
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The documents provided textual data suitable for a poststructuralist discourse analysis. 
They were part of the social, cultural and institutional context within which the case 
study was located. The content of the documents provided background information about 
the official assessment approaches that the tertiary supervisors were required to use. It 
was my belief that the documents would have contributed to the tertiary supervisors’ 
understanding and practice of assessment. The ‘reality’ that the institutional practicum 
documents constructed was part of the discourses within which the tertiary supervisors 
understood and practised assessment.  
 
All interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. Interview transcripts and documents 
were analysed in two stages using both inductive and deductive strategies. Stage 1 was a 
content analysis that drew on the literature and the emerging conceptual framework to 
identify themes and patterns related to the initial broad research question, How do tertiary 
supervisors understand and practise assessment? Data were transferred to a range of 
tables designed to display and track the themes and patterns and make them accessible for 
the next stage of analysis. Stage 2 involved examining the themes and patterns identified 
during the first stage of analysis using the selected poststructuralist constructs as 
theoretical tools for analysis.    
 
In the remainder of this article I theorise the findings drawing on Foucualt’s notions of 
governmentality, technologies of the self and power-knowledge.   
 
The Practicum Documents: A Technology of Government  
 
As soon as I get to the form, it feels like suddenly I can’t do anything other than the form 
dictates, and I’m bounded by these process that say I must follow these outlines that don’t 
necessarily give the flavour of what’s actually happened up to that point. (Olivia, TAFE 
& university supervisor, individual interview) 
 
The way that early childhood practicum assessment is to be organised and carried out is 
outlined in the practicum handbooks and policy and procedure manuals that are provided 
to students, field supervisors and tertiary supervisors. The official, written documents 
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provide the standard guidelines for practicum assessment, the basis for what happens and 
what tertiary supervisors do when they undertake practicum assessment. In this way, they 
produce and circulate knowledge about practicum assessment and how it is enacted, and 
thus form part of the discourse of early childhood practicum assessment. They are a form 
of institutional government; a technology of government, guiding and directing tertiary 
supervisors’ practices by providing norms for practice according to which the tertiary 
supervisors govern themselves. Olivia’s words above suggest that she experiences the 
assessment forms as a constraining technology of government, tightly shaping her 
practice, urging her to bridle her passion for showing the flavour of what is actually 
happening. Similarly, for Alison, the assessment form is a ‘guideline’, that ‘gives you the 
direction to head into’ but it ‘doesn’t give you, probably, opportunities to express how 
you’re feeling ... or what you’re seeing, in a general sort of way. (Alison, TAFE 
supervisor, focus group interview).   
 
The documents in and of themselves do not govern the tertiary supervisors’ practices. 
They are a part of the complex web of power-knowledge regimes within which tertiary 
supervisors understand the practice of assessment and themselves as tertiary supervisors, 
assessors, institutional representatives, early childhood professionals, and people. It is 
only when the practices and discourses produced, reproduced and circulated in and 
through the documents are taken up by the tertiary supervisors that there is a 
governmental effect; that there is action upon action. Government in this case is self-
government, with the tertiary supervisors acting upon their own actions (including future 
actions), ensuring that they produce themselves as ‘adequate’, knowledgeable and 
responsible: 
  
I did keep reading them [the assessment documents] so that I would feel that I was 
adequate, and knew what they [the university] expected. (Nola, university supervisor, 
individual interview).  
 
...there’s always the worry in the back of my mind that I’ll pass a student who hasn’t 
done some particular section or part of the competencies, and I mean that’s why when I 
first get it [the package of assessment documents] I always read and read to make sure 
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that I know exactly what has to be done (Glenys, university supervisor, individual 
interview)  
 
Nola and Glenys are engaged in practices of self-surveillance and normalisation ― 
technologies of the self. Glenys says that in the back of her mind she was worried about 
her future conduct. In this way she watches herself with an eye to her future actions in 
order to ensure that when she visits the students on placement she knows ‘exactly what 
has to be done’. Nola styles herself as a responsible representative of the university, one 
who knows what is expected; one who conforms to the norms of practice expected.   
 
Self-surveillance and normalisation were at times supported and extended through 
documentation. The documentation that the tertiary supervisors undertook was primarily 
about what they had observed the student doing and thus it was tied up with surveillance 
of the student. However their documentation also functions as a technology of power 
through which they exercise the power to constitute themselves as legitimate assessors 
who make valid judgements. In order to achieve themselves as credible assessors Alison 
and Tegan governed themselves through the practice of documentation.  
 
You can only assess on what you see on that day ... I have to be very sure of myself, and 
confident, and write what I see, so I can back it up if I’m queried. (Alison, TAFE 
supervisor, individual interview) 
 
I usually write it down really clearly, so I can validate why I’ve made that decision. 
(Tegan, TAFE supervisor, individual interview) 
 
Such documentation validates the tertiary supervisor’s judgement by providing evidence 
that they have practised according to the norms for the practice of assessment constructed 
in and through the documents. The TAFE and university assessment forms include a 
column in which the tertiary supervisor is expected to record evidence to support their 
judgement. The university Practicum Policies and Procedures Manual specifies that: 
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Comments to substantiate the student’s grade MUST be provided. If a student does not 
pass a competency it is important to provide examples in the comment column on the 
assessment report form in explanation. (The University, 2001a, p. 13) 
  
Tegan’s and Alison’s words suggest that they feel as though they are under surveillance; 
that someone is going to require them to validate and justify their decisions. Although 
they have the authority to govern, they are, as Rose (1999, p.27) suggests, ‘condemned to 
seek an authority for their authority’. 
 
Deferring to Discourses of Rationality: Privileging Observation 
 
As the participant quotes above suggest, one of the effects of governmentality in relation 
to assessment of the early childhood practicum is that tertiary supervisors regulate and 
silence their professional judgement and defer to discourses of scientific rationality when 
assessing students on practicum. By rationality I mean ‘any form of thinking which 
strives to be relatively clear, systematic and explicit about aspects of “external” or 
“internal” existence, about how things are or how they ought to be’ (Dean, 1999, p.3). 
The official practicum documents bring a form of rationality to how practicum 
assessment is to be carried out and produce and circulate discourses of rationality within 
which particular ways of making judgements and employing knowledge are made 
possible and desirable.  
 
In the institutional documents, the triadic assessment is constituted as a collaborative and 
consensual process. It is assumed that it is (usually) possible and desirable to gain a 
consensus on the normalising judgement of the student’s achievement. However, at the 
point of the triadic assessment, it was found that consensus is often achieved through the 
tertiary supervisors’ silence. A normalising judgement is made about their credibility as 
an assessor within the discourse of positivism, and their assessment of the student is 
silenced:  
 
I think it is quite frustrating when you can see a student, and you know the level that you 
expect a student to be working at, and the field supervisor disagrees with you ... and if 
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you don’t see it in two hours, you’ve really got to think, Is she doing it at other times? 
And you really question when the carer says, Yes, she is. You really question that, 
because you wonder, if I haven’t seen it in two hours … and they say, Well, she’s really 
nervous, and usually she does, it’s really hard. I find that really frustrating, because how 
do I know she is? And you have to take it; you have to really look at them and say, well, 
they’re the ones that are working with the student. But I have my doubts. (Tegan, TAFE 
supervisor, individual interview)  
 
 
Silence in the triadic assessment is a strategy of power, a strategy that allows the tertiary 
supervisors to govern themselves and turn themselves into the sort of tertiary supervisor 
that they believe they should be or are obliged be.  In Tegan’s words there is a sense that 
she feels obliged to ‘take it’ [the field supervisor’s judgement] if she is going to be seen 
as a rational and reasonable tertiary supervisor. Silence is a way that she controls her 
instincts ― her instinct that tells her that the level of competence she is expecting is not 
being demonstrated ― and governs herself. 
 
Tegan, chose to remain silent about the student’s level of achievement, because she 
perceived that what she knew about the student  quality of written work, observing the 
student’s practice for an hour or two  was not as valid as what the field supervisor 
knew. The field supervisor’s knowledge of the student is based on direct and prolonged 
observation. There was also a sense that it was the student’s practice in the field that was 
being assessed, and this is the field supervisor’s territory, her area of expertise. A 
discourse of competency-based assessment as direct observation of performance is 
circulated in and through the documents that Tegan had access to, which state that 
concerns and issues ‘should be discussed in a positive way in terms of performance’ 
(TAFE Institute 2, 2001, p. 1).  
 
Within the discourse of positivism, direct observation is the basis upon which a valid, 
scientific judgement is made. In a practicum assessment process constructed within this 
discourse, seeing the student’s practice over time is privileged, and acts as the truth upon 
which a judgement of competence is made. When the tertiary supervisors position 
 14 
themselves within this discourse, they silence their view on the grade that the student 
should be awarded. Their silences are produced within a relationship of power in which 
they are positioned and position themselves as powerless, and the field supervisor’s view 
prevails. For example, Glenys admitted that there had been occasions when she believed 
that the grade awarded to the student was ‘a little bit overly flattering to the student’, but 
she had not disagreed openly with the field supervisor’s judgement. As she explained: 
 
If you’ve got the decision of Should this student have an H1 or an H2?, I suppose all I can 
say is what I see in the written work, and sometimes I’ve felt, Oh, the written work’s only 
H2, but the teacher’s raving on about how good she is, and how she’s done this and that. 
(University supervisor, individual interview) 
 
In these situations, she silenced her view of the student’s standard, she did not challenge 
the teacher’s judgement ‘simply because it’s almost like, Well, what evidence have I got 
to go against that? The teacher’s been there; the teacher’s seen it’ (Glenys, university 
supervisor, individual interview). This view, that ‘seeing’ the student’s practice 
constitutes the truth upon which to make a judgement, was shared by other tertiary 
supervisors. Carol disagreed with the field supervisor’s assessment of the student’s level 
of achievement; however, she did not award the grade she believed appropriate, because, 
as she explained, ‘I didn’t have anything to contradict, but I couldn’t validate anything 
that they said, because it was all stuff I wasn’t there to see’.  
 
Olivia admitted to agreeing to pass students who she felt should not really pass. She, too, 
silenced her view of the students’ level of achievement and suitability for the profession 
because: 
 
If I failed them, ultimately, the decision would go back to the person who’d seen them 
most, and that would be the field supervisor. And so I knew that failing the student would 
antagonise the centre and the TAFE College, would create tension between the student and 
other teaching staff, and I couldn’t see the purpose of it. And then, I also think, Well, I have 




When the tertiary supervisors are involved in grading students or judging students’ 
competence, they appear to believe that they are not justified in exercising the power to 
have their view of the student’s standard of achievement heard and acted upon. They 
position themselves as powerless (to speak). This positioning is achieved within a 
positivist discourse, which privileges the use of scientific methods to discover reality, and 
the truth about the objects of that reality. Observation of behaviour is privileged in 
behaviourism, a strand of positivist discourse which competency-based assessment 
practices are derived from. This discourse is produced/reproduced in and though the 
practicum documents, for example, the university handbook states that if there is a 
dispute is between the field supervisor and the tertiary supervisor regarding the grade to 
be awarded, ‘the field supervisor’s views should prevail … in recognition of the fact that 
the field supervisor has more in-depth knowledge and consistent experience of the 
student’s performance during the practicum’ (The University, 2001, p. 16). 
 
Olivia, Glenys, Carol and Tegan consitute themselves as powerless  unable to speak 
and unable to make a valid decision  in and through their own acts of speaking: ‘I have 
only seen her for two hours. What do I know?’ and ‘it was all stuff I wasn’t there to see’. 
As they describe their beliefs and actions, they speak the discourse of positivism into 
existence. They constitute themselves as powerless to speak about the student’s standard 
of achievement and position the field supervisor as the one authorised to judge the 
student’s competence.  
 
Deferring to Discourses of Rationality: The Objective/Subjective Paradox 
 
The tertiary supervisors’ capacity to exercise their professional judgement was not only 
affected by a discourse of assessment that privileged direct observation as the basis for 
determining competence. Within a positivist discourse of assessment objectivity is also 
privileged. However the tertiary supervisors also had access to progressive educational 
discourses which foreground the importance of the ‘whole’ person and within which the 
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possibility and desirability of objectivity are open to question. These contradictory beliefs 
can be seen in Tegan’s uncertainty:  
 
You have to go in there being quite as objective as you can, but being really careful that 
you’re not taking too much of your opinion and your values into that assessment….I 
don’t know how to get around that [bringing your own values] ... I don’t know if there is 
a way because you’re always going to take some of yourself into it. And I think if you 
didn’t, you know, I don’t know what sort of a teacher you’d be if you didn’t ... (Tegan, 
TAFE supervisor, individual interview).  
 
Other tertiary supervisors acknowledged that the individual assessor’s judgement was 
involved but again, there was evidence of contradictory feelings about the use of 
professional judgement and a sense that this was not quite the right thing to do: 
 
I probably see assessment as, on a personal level, as a judgement thing, which you do, 
which you probably shouldn’t do, but I suppose everybody does, because you have your 
own ideas and philosophies (Alison, TAFE supervisor, focus group interview).  
 
I think gut feeling is worth as much … but then justifying it takes quite a bit of thought 
(Ingrid, TAFE and university supervisor, focus group interview). 
 
Assessment for me is assessing students against national competency standards, so it 
consists a benchmark…as to how we judge our students, because to some extent we do 
judge. The thing that concerns me is, I think, with the standards is that they’re open to a 
lot of interpretation from different people (Debra, TAFE supervisor, focus group 
interview). 
 
It appeared that the TAFE supervisors were more anxious about using their professional 
judgement than the university supervisors were. All of the TAFE supervisors had 
undergone formal assessor training in using CBA. They were immersed in the more 
technical, objective discourse of competency, which was likely to have led to a strong 
conviction that objectivity was possible and desirable.  
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In contrast, the university supervisors were more firmly positioned within humanistic and 
progressive discourses. They had undergone supervisor training that was based on adult 
learning theory and were using assessment forms comprised of broader competencies. 
The university supervisors seemed to have accepted that they would need to interpret the 
competencies and use a degree of professional judgement in order to come to a decision, 
as Ingrid’s and Rachel’s comments indicate: 
 
We make the interpretation, I suppose ... It’s not written there — I mean, we can’t say it’s 
there in black and white. Our professionalism and our experience make that decision 
(Ingrid, TAFE/university supervisor, focus group interview).  
 
It is subjective and it is to a large extent yours and the field supervisor’s subjectivity in 
assessing what you consider to be the important norms (Rachel, university supervisor, 
focus group interview). 
 
The TAFE supervisors were aware that they could and sometimes should use their 
judgement; they believed they had experience that justified the exercise of professional 
judgement.  However, they still felt uncertain about this, and were more likely to attempt 
to pass their professional judgements off as objective by strategically linking them to a 
competency:  
 
You just get a feeling, and that’s when, I suppose, the assessment does let you down, 
because I have a feeling about this student — and sometimes it’s just a feeling. You think 
there’s something just not quite right with this student, so you have to sit there and really 
pin it down to a competency. And that’s really hard because, again, it’s values, and I’m 
making a value judgement, and sometimes you’re not sure. (Tegan, TAFE supervisor, 
individual interview)  
 
Tegan's strategy was to pin it down to a competency, because ‘just a feeling’ was not a 
scientifically sound basis for a judgement. When faced with behaviour not specifically 
identified in the assessment documents as inappropriate, but not appropriate according to 
her own professional standards, Tegan pinned the behaviour down to a competency and 
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‘slotted’ it into the assessment form, so that she could legitimately deem the student ‘Not 
Competent’. She called on the documents and competencies therein to normalise and 
regulate the student; she interpreted the student’s behaviour and the competencies to 
create a match. This strategy created the illusion that she was using the template provided 
by the assessment documents and creating an assessment that was valid and objective. 
The production of this assessment strategy enabled Tegan to position herself within a 
positivist discourse of assessment as a rational, objective assessor while maintaining her 
subjectivity as a responsible representative of the institution and the profession.  
 
Taking up the Discourse of Competence 
 
For the most part, the tertiary supervisors (particularly the TAFE supervisors) saw the use 
of national standards or competency frameworks as a positive thing. The TAFE 
supervisors’ positive regard for national standards links back to their privileging of the 
objective and their immersion in technical discourses of competency. At times they found 
them constraining and limiting, but they longed for consistency and objectivity, and 
expressed the desire for guidelines and benchmarks, believing that they led to a more 
objective and consistent assessment. This belief is captured in Bron’s comment that, ‘If 
you’ve got the competency book, the checklist, or whatever you want to call it, at least 
we know what we’re supposed to be looking for’ (TAFE supervisor, focus group 
interview).  
 
There was a belief that such frameworks represented a consensus on what is appropriate 
practice. For the TAFE tertiary supervisors, there was comfort in the fact that what they 
were looking for when they assessed students was not just the opinion of one person, it 
was what the ‘industry’ (as the experts) considered necessary. As Bron put it, ‘At least it 
is consistent state-wide…it’s not just one person’s opinion’.  Evelyn expressed similar 




I need parameters to work by. I need guidelines to work by, not only from the point of 
view that I’m doing the right thing but also that there is still the general trend being 
followed by a group of people who are individuals within the system. (Evelyn, 
TAFE/university supervisor).  
 
The TAFE tertiary supervisors trusted numbers and consensus because within modernist 
discourses of assessment, these guarantee objectivity. This can be understood as an 
integral part of ‘the project of modernity and Enlightenment thinking’ (Dahlberg, Moss, 
& Pence, 1999, p. 88) that we (including the tertiary supervisors) are caught up in. The 
effects of this are that we seek reassurance rather than understanding; we want the 
‘guarantee of expert assessment instead of the uncertainty of making our own 
judgements’ (Dahlberg, Moss, & Pence, 1999, p. 92).  
 
Implications for Practice: Insights and Concluding Comments 
 
The concern about the use of assessor judgement, or professional judgement, when 
coming to a decision about a student’s competence was problematic for many of the 
tertiary supervisors. The objective/subjective paradox is an effect of being positioned 
within contradictory discourses: positivist discourses which privilege objectivity, liberal 
humanist discourses which assume a rational individual capable of making logical 
decisions, and progressive discourses which privilege the consideration of the ‘whole’ 
student. One way to address this complexity is by recognising the constitutive force of 
these discourses and the effects of their contradictory nature.  
 
Poststructuralist frameworks for understanding the world provide one way of coming to 
that recognition. I suggest that we could do what Davies did with and for the children in 
her two studies on children and gender (1989, 1993); that is, give those who have an 
investment in the practicum access to poststructuralist perspectives. The use of 
poststructuralist theory has the potential to provide tertiary supervisors, field supervisors 
and students with an understanding of the discourses within which they are implementing 
assessment of the early childhood practicum, how these discourses subject and constitute 
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them, and the effects of this in terms of practicum assessment. They may then use this 
understanding to create spaces in which they can speak and act differently (Davies, 
1990).  
 
The effect of being immersed within technical, scientific discourses of assessment such 
as CBA is the belief that objectivity is possible and desirable, and thus the use of 
professional judgement becomes problematic (Jones, 1999). This is despite the fact that 
there is an acknowledgment that professional judgement plays a legitimate role in the 
judgement of competency (Bailey, 1995; Gillis & Bateman, 1999; Griffin, 1995; Hager, 
Goncsi, & Athanasou, 1994; Jones, 1999; Wolf, 1995). The message appears not to be 
getting through to those who implement CBA. This suggests the need for professional 
development that informs supervisors about the role of professional judgement in CBA 
and involves them in exploring the implications of a more holistic notion of competence 
and how it might be assessed.  
 
It seems that the use of assessment forms that involve a multitude of narrow prescriptive 
performance criteria leads to the idea that assessment using competencies is objective and 
requires no professional judgement. It also leads to unacknowledged ‘subjective 
judgement’, or to passing a subjective judgement off as objective, as Tegan did. As long 
as subjective judgements are hidden in this way the opportunity for open dialogue and 
critical reflection are lost. The students (and the field supervisors) do not know the ‘real’ 
reason for the failure. When forms are more open and flexible, those who use them 
appear to accept that professional judgement will be needed. It may be that more open 
competency standards are desirable because they encourage all participants in the 
assessment process to reflect on and discuss their judgements. Therefore, the adoption of 
more open and flexible assessment frameworks, accompanied by an acknowledgement 
that professional judgement is required, may hold the potential to address the 
objective/subjective paradox. It would require dialogue among those who develop and 
those who implement assessment frameworks. Dialogue takes time, and thus has a 
financial aspect to it which must be considered in the light of lack of funding for 
practicum, which has led to a decrease in the involvement of tertiary supervisors in 
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practicum supervision, particularly in university-based early childhood teacher education 
courses.  
 
The implications for practice, then, centre on the need to create spaces for critical 
dialogue and the development of self consciousness about the effects of dominant 
discourses and how they shape the expectations and practices of practicum participants. 
In becoming self conscious about the effects of the dominant discourses practicum 
participants may then be able to think, speak, and act differently― the possibility lies in 
unmasking and problematising the discourses of power-knowledge that produce the 
‘constructions, practices and boundaries’ that limit our knowledge and ability to think 
critically (Dahlberg, Moss, & Pence, 1999, p. 34).  Costin’s (2003) research (described 
earlier) demonstrated that it is possible to change the assessment discourse and 
(re)constitute assessors as legitimate subjective observers. This was achieved by 
rewriting the assessment documents, dialogue with and between assessors, reflection on 
the process, and further action based on this: cycles of action that make up action 
research. It was not easy, and there was resistance. Costin found, however, that once the 
idea of a different way to assess became part of the discourse of WorldSkills assessment, 
it spread beyond those who were immediate participants in the process. Through 
networks, presentations, and dialogue with others, the legitimising of the assessor’s 
professional judgement became a desirable feature of WorldSkills assessment. This is 
something we might seek to do in relation to assessment of the early childhood 
practicum, and the objective/subjective paradox that exists and makes assessment 
problematic for tertiary supervisors, while keeping in mind that changing the discourse 
and legitimating the subjective has its own dangers.  
 
Note 
[1] I use the term ‘tertiary supervisor’ because the participants in the study supervised 
early childhood students enrolled in two different types of tertiary institutions ―TAFE 
and university. When I draw on direct quotes I indicate whether the participant quoted 




[2] The term ‘field supervisor’ is used rather than supervising teacher or cooperating 
teacher in order to take account of the diverse qualifications held by site-based practicum 
supervisors in prior-to-school settings.  
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